Childcare Assistance: Are Subsidies or Tax Credits Better?

We evaluate price subsidies and tax credits for childcare. We focus on partnered women's labour supply, household income and welfare, demand for childcare and government expenditure. Using Australian data, we estimate a joint, discrete structural model of labour supply and childcare demand. We introduce two methodological innovations – a more flexible quantity constraint that total formal and informal childcare hours are at least as large as the mother's labour supply and the explicit inclusion of maternal childcare in the utility function as a proxy for child development. We find that tax credits are more effective than subsidies in terms of increasing average hours worked and household income. However, tax credits disproportionately benefit wealthier and more educated women. Price subsidies, while less efficient, have positive redistributional effects.     

Inflation Targeting,Recursive Inattentiveness,and Heterogeneous Beliefs

We consider a monetary authority that provides an explicit inflation target in order to align expectations with the policy objective. However, biased perceptions of the target may arise due to imperfect information flows. We allow agents to revise expectations over time and we model their recursive choice among prediction strategies as an optimization problem under rational inattention. We then investigate whether a simple policy rule can steer the economy toward the targeted equilibrium. Our findings suggest that determinacy under rational expectations may not be sufficient to reach the target. Instead, monetary policy should be fine‐tuned to correct agents' biased beliefs.     

The Drivers of Sovereign CDS Spread Changes: Local Versus Global Factors

We use daily data for a panel of 34 countries to investigate regional differences in sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) spread determinants and the significance of local versus global market factors. Similar to prior studies, we find a high level of commonality among CDS spreads, but our results show that this effect is stronger in Latin American CDS. The results of our quantile panel regression model show that although global forces drive spreads across the conditional distribution, changes in credit ratings are significant in explaining CDS spreads only in the upper quantiles. We also confirm the existence of regional differences in spread determinants.     

Do dictatorships redistribute more?

This paper examines the effect of political institutions on fiscal redistribution for a country-level panel from 1960–2010. Using data on Gini coefficients before and after government intervention, we apply a measure of effective fiscal redistribution that reflects the effect of taxes and transfers on income inequality. Our findings clearly indicate that non-democratic regimes demonstrate significantly greater direct fiscal redistribution. Subsequently, we employ fiscal data in an attempt to enlighten this puzzling empirical finding. We find that dictatorial regimes rely more heavily on cash transfers that exhibit a direct impact on net inequality and consequently on the difference between market and net inequality (i.e., effective fiscal redistribution), whereas democratic regimes devote a larger amount of resources to public inputs (health and education) that may influence market inequality but not the difference between market and net inequality per se. We argue that the driving force behind the observed differences within the pattern on government spending and effective fiscal redistribution is that democratic institutions lead survival-oriented leaders to care more for the private market, and thus to follow policies that enhance the productivity of the whole economy.     

Reasonable and Risk‐Based? Replacing NFIP Generally Subsidized Rates with a Means‐Tested Subsidy

The National Flood Insurance Program was created to seek two often conflicting goals: (i) shifting risks from federal taxpayers to those who choose to live in flood plains and (ii) ensuring flood insurance is available to everyone at “reasonable” rates. Efforts to accomplish the second goal currently take the form of subsidies based on location and the date a home was constructed. The resulting revenue from subsidized insurance premiums is not sufficient to cover the true cost of flood insurance, and federal taxpayers have paid the difference: $30 billion to date. Based on a detailed survey of households in the high‐risk flood zones of New York City (NYC), we find that replacing existing premium subsidies with risk‐based prices and a subsidy for low‐income housing‐burdened households could better meet both goals by ensuring low‐income individuals have access to affordable flood insurance while still saving the federal taxpayer up to $183 million per year in NYC alone.     

COVID-19 fatalities and internal conflict: Does government economic support matter?

This study examines the association between COVID-19 mortality rates and internal conflict and investigates the possible moderating role of government economic support during the pandemic years of 2020 and 2021. Our main hypothesis suggests that countries with lower levels of government economic support are more likely to experience a positive correlation between higher COVID-19 mortality rates and the emergence of internal conflict. Using cross-country data from over 100 countries and controlling for various factors that may influence internal conflict, our analysis provides some support for this hypothesis. The results suggest a possible moderating role for government economic support, with the evidence indicating a weakening or elimination of the association between COVID-19 mortality rates and internal conflict when government economic support is adequate. However, the moderating effect of government economic support is not always significant, and caution is needed when interpreting the results. Our analysis also highlights the potential risks associated with low levels of government economic support during the pandemic. Specifically, we find that in countries where the government's macro-financial package in response to the pandemic is less than approximately 25% of GDP, there is a possible risk of growth in civil disorder resulting from increased COVID-19 deaths per million.     

How Inequality Affects Trust in Institutions: Evidence from Indonesia

Trust is an important ingredient to improve economic performance and people's welfare by alleviating market failures caused by imperfect information, costly enforcement, or coordination failures. Using the World Values Survey 2018, we estimate the impact of village and district levels inequality on trust in institutions in Indonesia. We find that higher village level inequality has a negative effect only on trust in strangers, while higher district level inequality reduces trust in television, the press, the central government, the courts, and the police. The implication points to the importance of keeping inequality at the aggregate level in check to maintain people's trust in social, political and state institutions.     

Evaluating Small Businesses' Performance in Public e‐Procurement: Evidence from the Italian Government's e‐Marketplace

e‐Procurement is widely advocated as an effective tool to promote the participation of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as well as micro enterprises in the public procurement market. However, little evidence exists as to what factors may influence the allocation of contracts to differently sized suppliers. We address this issue by analyzing a rather rich and unique data set, namely the “direct award” (low‐value) transactions that took place on the Italian e‐marketplace during the period 2005–2010. In this paper, we exploit data from low‐value transactions to test the impact of different structural dimensions of the national public e‐marketplace on the probability that firms of different size are awarded public contracts, particularly focusing on micro and small firms. We find that both the nature of the public buyer and the characteristics of the traded goods/services do have an impact on different firms' ability to be awarded public contracts. We also test to what extent the geographical distance between public buyers and private suppliers explains the propensity of different size class of firms to be awarded public contracts, proving, at least to some extent, that some features of “physical” procurement markets are mirrored in the “virtual” market.     

Dancing to the Donors' Tune? Policy Choice in Aid‐Dependent Countries

Current aid rhetoric emphasizes the selective allocation of otherwise unconditional funds in support of the recipients' own plans, in contrast to the old donor practice of bundling money and policies. I show that when recipients have private information, policies reflecting their preferences and knowledge might result in such a regime. However, generous transfers can also induce them to conform to the outcome‐oriented expectations of donors at the expense of lower aid impact. Such behaviour is consistent with an abundance of case‐study evidence. Moderate disagreements over what the optimal policy is could actually produce better results. Certain forms of both donor competition and coordination might also eliminate this distortion, while a donor concern for need only removes incentives for aid‐seeking in the least needy countries. In summary, optimal aid policies are highly context‐specific, and donors should thus concentrate their efforts to practise more informed selectivity.     

REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT DEBT IN A BORROWING‐CONSTRAINED ECONOMY

We develop a two‐period, three‐class of income model where low‐income agents are borrowing constrained because of capital market imperfections, and where redistributive expenditure is financed by tax and government debt. When the degree of capital market imperfection is high, there is an ends‐against‐the‐middle equilibrium where the constrained low‐income and the unconstrained high‐income agents favour low levels of government debt and redistributive expenditure; these agents form a coalition against the middle. In this equilibrium, the levels of government debt and expenditure might be below the efficient levels, and the spread of income distribution results in a lower debt‐to‐GDP ratio.